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CHRISTIAN VIRTUES AND THE DOCTRINE 
OF THE MEAN 
Robert B. Kruschwitz 
Perhaps the most positive evaluation of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean in 
recent years is this one by 1. O. Urmson: " ... provided that we realize that 
[Aristotle] is discussing the excellence of character that is manifested in the 
practical life of the eudaimon, not Christian virtues, I cannot see that the mistakes 
we have noted [in Aristotle's doctrine] are major, or render his account seriously 
inadequate in principle. I" What interests me is the suggestion (for which Urmson 
does not argue) that the doctrine of the mean does not apply to Christian virtues. 
For many philosophers that Aristotle's doctrine of the mean fails to apply to 
the Christian virtues is no surprise, since they think it fails to apply, period. 
They say: "Opposed to each virtue are many bad character traits, and they cannot 
be helpfully characterized as excesses or deficiencies. Aristotle's doctrine is out 
of touch with the facts of moral failure." 
Against the majority of philosophers I will argue that the doctrine of the mean 
correctly describes a significant range of virtues. I say "range of virtues" because 
even Aristotle does not think it applies to all virtues. Against philosophers like 
Urmson I will argue that the doctrine of the mean does apply to many Christian 
virtues, but, for an interesting reason, does not apply to the Christian virtue of 
hope. 
Before proceeding to the main arguments, I will introduce and clarify some 
key terms. 
I. 
What is a "Christian virtue"? Moral philosophers in the virtue tradition distin-
guish the way a person happens to be and what she would be were she to become 
all that she could be. The latter, the goal, and not the former, the starting place, 
is called "human nature" in this tradition, and it is conceivable that no one fully 
attains human nature in her lifetime. A virtue is a character trait which is necessary 
for moving from what we are to full attainment of what we can be. Vices are 
traits which prevent the move. 
Christians disagree with other traditions on what men and women can and 
should be. Corresponding to this is disagreement about the list of virtues. Christian 
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faith, hope, and love, for example, are Christian virtues in two senses: (1) they 
are on the Christian list of virtues, and (2) they are not on most non-Christian 
lists because they presuppose acceptance of Christian doctrines about human 
nature. In this paper I use "Christian virtue" in the second, stronger sense. 
Different types of character traits count as virtues. Aristotle distinguished 
intellectual and moral virtues. These are not exhaustive categories, but they do 
pick out significant groups of virtues. Aristotle discusses the doctrine of the 
mean only in relation to moral virtues, character traits which involve ways of 
feeling emotion as well as ways of thinking and acting. 2 
Some moral virtues involve acting in accord with various emotions. Other 
moral virtues involve controlling various emotions that typically impede virtuous 
judgment and behavior. Robert C. Roberts marks this difference between "sub-
stantive and motivational virtues" (e.g., compassion, justice, generosity, 
promise-keeping, and kindness) and "virtues of will power" (e.g., patience, 
courage, and self-control).3 The former are "substantive" because "they are the 
psychological embodiment of ethical rules-the substance of ethical patterns of 
behavior and judgment and emotion." They are "motivational" because they 
provide moral motives: one can do the right thing "out of' compassion, etc. The 
virtues of will power, on the other hand, are not substantive in that they do not 
characteristically lead to any ethical behavior, judgment, or emotion: "Racists, 
cheats, sadists, and thieves may well be persevering, resolute, and self-control-
led; . . . " The virtues of will power are not motivational either: one does not 
act "out of' courage, self-control, etc., though one may do the right (or wrong) 
thing "in virtue" of one's courage or self-control if the situation demands the 
exercise of these virtues. 4 
With these distinctions we can begin to clarify the structures of three Christian 
moral virtues: faith, hope, and love. 
Hope is a substantive and motivational virtue. Briefly these conditions are 
necessary for displaying the Christian virtue of hope: 
1) a concern for "Heaven," that is, a longing for a joy that cannot be 
had in this world," 
2) a construal of this world's pleasures as "never meant to satisfy [the 
longing for Heaven], but only to arouse it, to suggest the real thing,"5 
3) the feeling based on this concern and construal is relatively strong 
and enduring; and if it is not, one is prepared to encourage this concern 
and construal, and 
4) in suitable circumstances, one endorses action out of this concern 
and construal. 
The first two conditions are also conditions for feeling the emotion hope; they 
distinguish this virtue from other substantive and motivational virtues. The latter 
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two conditions are common to all of the substantive and motivational virtues; 
they indicate the role of emotion in one's motivational structure and one's com-
mitment to being motivated by the appropriate emotions. 
For each of the necessary conditions of the virtue hope listed above, one can 
think of character traits which would block that condition; each of these would 
be a vice. The vices which block the last two conditions would not be specially 
related to hope; such vices, as akrasia and a lack of moral seriousness, would 
prevent the formation of all substantive and motivational virtues. Vices which 
block the first two conditions, the "special conditions of hope," would be vices 
associated just with the virtue of hope; thus, they could be called forms of despair. 
Likewise Christian love, agape, is a substantive and motivational virtue. 
Agape, as a Christian virtue, is sometimes described as our love for God, and 
sometimes as Christian love for others. For the present, I will subscribe to the 
latter interpretation; I will have more to say in section IV about agape as love 
for God. Further, it will suit my purpose to discuss just one aspect of "Christian 
love for others," Christian compassion. I will call the emotion involved "sym-
pathy." These conditions are necessary for displaying the Christian virtue of 
compassion and not just experiencing sympathy: 
1) a construal of another person as suffering or deficient in some way, 
2) a construal of that person, regardless of whether he be friend or foe, 
as a fellow sufferer-as someone suffering or deficient in a way one is 
or might be (this condition distinguishes compassion from pity), 
3) a concern for one's own suffering and deficiencies, 
4) because of (2) and (3) one has a concern for the other person's 
condition, 
5) the feeling based on these concerns and construals is relatively strong 
and enduring; and if it is not, one is prepared to encourage these concerns 
and construals, and 
6) in suitable circumstances, one endorses action out of these concerns 
and construals. 6 
The first four conditions are the special conditions of compassion: they are also 
conditions for experiencing sympathy, the emotion associated with the virtue, 
and they distinguish this virtue from other substantive and motivational virtues. 
Vices which block these special conditions would be vices associated just with 
the virtue of compassion. 
Faith is a more complex Christian virtue. On the one hand, it is like a virtue 
of will power. James Muyskens has described faith as fidelity towards God: 
persevering in one's commitment to God despite the doubts and fears which 
accompany that commitment because it must be based on less than complete 
evidence. 7 Robert Adams takes trust to be the essential ingredient in faith: 
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depending solely on God's power, justice, and goodness despite the "lust for 
control of one's own life."8 In spite of their differences, Muyskens and Adams 
put the emphasis on controlling one's believing and behavior in the face of 
various emotions, not on being motivated by an emotion or emotions. On the 
other hand, neither would reduce Christian faith to intellectual courage or self-con-
trol, which is morally neutral, capable of being pressed into service by both 
Christian and scoundrel. Perhaps, just as marital fidelity and trust involves both 
love and courage, Christian faith involves both love for God and something like 
intellectual courage. If so, then this virtue is partly a virtue of will power and 
partly a substantive virtue, the love of God. I will treat faith as a virtue of will 
power, and in section IV consider the love of God as an alternative interpretation 
of the Christian virtue of love. 
What makes each of these virtues "Christian"? Why is each not found on 
non-Christian lists of virtues? The answer appears when these virtues are com-
pared to the similar virtues which are found on non-Christian lists. Christian 
hope differs from various non-Christian virtues (e.g., the Marxian's hope for a 
classless society, a parent's hope for her child's future happiness, etc.) in both 
the conative and cognitive special conditions: the Christian desires heaven and 
believes that heaven is not just unattainable at this moment, but is unattainable 
in this life. Christian compassion differs from various non-Christian virtues of 
compassion for his child) in just the cognitive special condition: the Christian 
has reason to construe every sufferer, friend or foe, relation or not, as a fellow 
sufferer. In Christian compassion there are no limits on whom one must construe 
as a fellow. Christian faith differs from non-Christian faiths in the object of 
commitment; they are similar to the extent that faith is fidelity to one's ultimate 
commitment or trust in one's ultimate love. 
The fact that hope and compassion are Christian substantive virtues for different 
reasons is not unimportant, for it helps to explain why hope is, but compassion 
is not, an exception to the doctrine of the mean. I tum now to explaining and 
defending that doctrine. 
II. 
According to Aristotle a good person, a person who is realizing human nature, 
exhibits the mean in her emotional reactions as well as in her actions. In contrast 
is the self-controlled person, the enkrates: she bears down and controls her 
behavior to the mean, but it is a great effort because her emotions are out of 
control. She does what is right, but her heart is not in it. 
Urmson points out that the doctrine of the mean applies primarily to settled 
states of character, not to emotions or actions. When Aristotle calls generosity 
the mean "determined by reason" he means a person's characteristic way of 
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feeling and acting in situations of need should be the moderate, reasoned dispo-
sition of feeling the appropriate emotion (compassion, pity, civic pride, etc.) in 
the proper situations and toward the appropriate people, and of acting in the 
proper way. Though the doctrine of the mean is compatible with a doctrine of 
moderation (that a person should always exhibit a moderate amount of emotion), 
it is not identical to it. 9 Some situations obviously require that one feel and act 
very generously; a moderate amount is not enough. On other occasions any 
generous reaction is inappropriate: even a moderate amount of generosity toward 
a freeloader feigning need is too much. 
So the doctrine of the mean is this. Each specific moral virtue involves one 
or more emotions. In each case a person can be either disposed to exhibit the 
emotion(s) to the right amount, which is a virtue, or disposed to exhibit the 
emotion(s) too much or too little, which are vices. "Too much" could mean "on 
too many occasions" or "towards too many people" and such like as well as "too 
violently"; "too little" includes "on too few occasions" and "towards too few 
people" and such like as well as "too weakly." 10 
So much for explaining the doctrine of the mean; now a response to three 
common objections. The doctrine is based on two assumptions, (1) that displaying 
a moral virtue means, in part, experiencing one or more emotions, and (2) that 
having some vices means, in part, being disposed to experience those emotions 
excessively or deficiently. The second and third objections are that these two 
assumptions are false. The first objection is that the doctrine does not apply, for 
various reason, to some moral virtues Aristotle treats. 
The first objection is correct. Once it is agreed that Aristotle misapplies his 
doctrine, the remaining force of this objection seems to be that we do not know 
to which virtues the doctrine applies and why. The objection loses its force if 
we can specify the doctrine's range of application, and in a rough way I think 
we can. 
As an initial hypothesis, let us say that the doctrine of the mean applies only 
to the substantive and motivational virtues. Confidence in the hypothesis that 
the doctrine does apply to the substantive virtues will build as we consider the 
next objections. Here we can say why it does not apply to the virtues of will 
power. These virtues are necessary just because on some occasions one fears, 
doubts, etc. "too much" (e.g., faith maintains the relationship when one is too 
ready to give it up in the face of "the silence of God") or fears, doubts, etc. 
"too little" (e.g., courage tells one to give it up when one is too ready to continue 
the relationship recklessly). The excessive or deficient emotion does not indicate 
a vice; it indicates a time of testing, a time when the virtue may be exhibited. 
If one's fears, for example, always were felt to the mean, then one would not 
thereby exhibit courage; courage would not be necessary. 
The second objection to the doctrine of the mean is that the connection between 
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displaying a moral virtue and feeling a given emotion is, at best, a contingent 
feature of human psychology. The best response to this objection is to clarify, 
with an example, the conceptual link between a substantive virtue and emotion. 
My example is Christian compassion and the emotion I called sympathy. 
Among the necessary conditions for acting out of compassion listed above, the 
"special conditions," (1) through (4), are also involved in just experiencing 
sympathy. Feeling this emotion requires certain construals (seeing the sufferings 
of others and seeing it as like one's own) and a certain concern (basically a 
concern for one's own suffering-which leads to a concern for the other's suf-
fering). This does not seem to be all that is involved (bodily states and psychic 
feelings are a part), but these are necessary conditions for the emotion of sym-
pathy. 
That these conditions, by themselves, are not sufficient for either displaying 
the virtue or feeling the emotion explains why a person can have one without 
the other. That these conditions are necessary for both explains why sympathy 
is typically motivation for compassionate behavior, and thus is a normal part of 
displaying the virtue of compassion. The rationale for studying the emotion or 
emotions appropriate to a specific substantive virtue to delineate the associated 
substantive vices is clear: some of the reasons one regularly fails to experience 
an appropriate emotion are reasons one regularly fails to act from that specific 
virtue, and such regular failure is indicative of a vice associated with that virtue. 
According to the third objection, even if having a substantive moral virtue 
means, in part, experiencing one or more emotions, this does not support the 
further assumption that having some vices means, in part, being disposed to 
experience those emotions excessively or deficiently. II Grant, for the sake of 
argument, that the virtue of compassion involves feeling sympathy in the right 
circumstances (for the right people, on the right occasions, for the proper reason, 
etc.) and the numerous vices associated with compassion characteristically include 
either failure to feel sympathy in the right circumstances or a tendency to feel 
sympathy in the wrong circumstances. Would it not be very odd if, further, each 
vice was either a vice of excess emotion (feeling sympathy "too often," in all 
the right circumstances and in some of the wrong ones), or a vice of deficient 
emotion (feeling sympathy "too seldom," never in inappropriate circumstances, 
but not in all the right ones)? And, this objection continues, if it happened that 
experiencing sympathy did run the gamut from rarely feeling it to frequently 
feeling it, passing fortuitously through feeling it in just the right situations, would 
this not be, at best, a contingent fact of human psychology? Would it not be 
conceivable, indeed more likely, that one might have, for example, the vice of 
"family absorption": feeling sympathy only sometimes when one should (as when 
one correctly sees that a loved one suffers, but is oblivious to "outsiders'" 
suffering), and sometimes when one should not (as when one mistakes a loved 
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one's tantrum for real suffering)? 
My response to this third objection turns on the difference between construals 
and concerns, the two elements common to emotion and substantive virtue. 
A construal is a way of "seeing-as," of taking some features of a situation as 
salient and others as relatively unimportant, and, perhaps, of ignoring still other 
features altogether. The construal signals whether any concerns are relevant in 
a situation and which these are. One may be very concerned for the health of 
one's son, for example, but until one construes a situation as a threat to his 
health or as an opportunity to improve or protect his health, etc., that concern 
idles and has no active part in one's emotional life. An occurrence of an emotion 
involves a construal; a substantive virtue involves a dispositional pattern of 
thinking and focusing which shapes construals. 
Concerns are valuations, and people value many different things. To borrow 
a metaphor from Quine, a person has a "web of concerns" in which many are 
unimportant, others very important, and few most important. The web can be 
modified, but changing the most important strands is slow, difficult work. We 
criticize a web of concerns for what it contains ("No one should be interested 
in rehabilitating Richard Nixon's image"), for the relations between the strands 
of concern ("You can be interested in restoring prestige to the office of President 
without being interested in rehabilitating Nixon's image"), and for how important 
a concern is in the web ("Y ou cannot focus your life on restoring prestige to the 
office of President; other political, religious, and personal concerns should be 
more important"). 
Based on this distinction there are two sources of substantive vice: (1) one 
might have inappropriate dispositional patterns of thinking and focusing, or (2) 
the relevant concern might be too unimportant or important in one's web of 
concerns. 
The vice of "family absorption" flows from the first source: one might put an 
appropriate value on human suffering, but as a matter of habit focus only on 
family member's complaints. As we saw, this vice cannot be usefully charac-
terized as excessive or deficient. The same may be said of the great variety of 
vices flowing from the first source, and this is the element of truth in the third 
objection. However, some vices flow only from the second source: as a rule one 
correctly construes situations, but one's concern is too unimportant or important. 
These are the substantive vices which are deficiencies orexcesses~f concern. 
The doctrine of the mean applies only to the substantive and motivational 
virtues. Does it apply to all of them? That it does seems plausible. After all, is 
not every concern of great importance in some circumstances, of less importance 
in others? In many circumstances family affection (concern for one's family) 
outweighs patriotism (concern for one's community); less commonly, in emergen-
cies perhaps, patriotism is more important. Surely there is such a thing as caring 
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too much (and too little) for one's family or country, and it will likely show up 
in the less common cases. 
Put another way, the doctrine of the mean reflects Aristotle's claim that a 
good life involves many concerns, no one of which dominates all the others in 
every circumstance. The good man is a good citizen, a good parent, a good 
friend, a good thinker, etc. 
To sum up my defense: Substantive virtues and associated emotions are con-
ceptually tied to a due concern; on this analysis, substantive virtues cannot be 
excessive or deficient and cannot lead to bad actions. 12 Some (but not all) vices 
associated with each substantive virtue are defined by excessive or deficient 
concerns, and it is these vices to which the doctrine of the mean points. It is 
tempting to go a step further and conclude that the doctrine of the mean applies 
to all substantive virtues: that for each virtue there are at least two associated 
vices, one of excessive and one of deficient concern. 
III. 
Does the doctrine of the mean apply to Christian substantive virtues? It applies 
to Christian compassion. Kant provides an example of a vice of deficient concern, 
of placing too little importance on one's suffering, in the case of the philanthropist 
of cold temperament. He sees others as fellow sufferers, but being unconcerned 
with his own deficiencies and suffering, he is not sufficiently concerned with 
the suffering of others. He is "indifferent to the sufferings of others-perhaps 
because, being endowed with the special gift of patience and robust endurance 
in his own sufferings, he assumed the like in others or even demanded it; ... "11 
Aristotle suggests a personality who might display a vice of excessive concern, 
"depressed world absorption." With this vice one cannot act out of compassion 
even though one construes others as fellow sufferers because one is too concerned 
with one's own and others' suffering and deficiencies. "Old men," Aristotle 
writes, "may feel pity, as well as young men, but not for the same reason. Young 
men feel it out of kindness; old men out of weakness, imagining that anything 
that befalls anyone else might easily happen to them. "14 Such an "old man" might 
be unable to feel sympathy and act compassionately not because he does not see 
fellow sufferers, but because he sees them, pauses to consider that their misfortune 
will surely befall him and that he may not be as able as they are to deal with 
it, and becomes absorbed in self-pity. He is too concerned about others' suffering, 
and especially, his own suffering. Closer to home, perhaps, are the similar 
experiences of a young adult generation numbed by constant sympathizing with 
victims of war and disaster imaged on the television news. The self-pity which 
marks their excessive concern often outwardly looks like a lack of concern. 
Other vices of excessive and deficient concern are associated with Christian 
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compassion,15 but we need not describe them here. Enough has been said to 
show that the doctrine of the mean, as defended above, applies to some Christian 
virtues. 
Now consider the case with Christian hope. In relation to the second special 
condition, the construal of this world's pleasures as meant to arouse one's desire 
for heaven but not to satisfy it, one can imagine a person who misconstrues the 
world, believing she can be entirely, "eternally" happy in this life. That is, she 
desires heaven, but believes she can achieve heaven on earth. This sort of person 
may be more or less self-deceived in various ways about (1) the nature of her 
desires, (2) her belief that those desires can be satisfied in this life, and (3) the 
demands which (as a practical consequence) she brings to the objects of this 
life. That is to say, such a person may be more or less aware of her condition 
of despair. C. S. Lewis labels this sort of despair "foolishness." He describes a 
particularly self-deluded fool this way: "He goes on all his life thinking that if 
only he tried another woman, or went for a more expensive holiday, or whatever 
it is, then this time he really would catch the mysterious something which we 
are all after." 16 Foolishness is a vice which flows from misconstruing the world, 
and the doctrine of the mean does not point to such vice. 
In relation to the first special condition, the concern for heaven, the doctrine 
of the mean leads one to expect two, opposed, sorts of vices: one might be too 
much concerned, or too little concerned about heaven. In the Augustinian tradi-
tion, however, hope is an exception to the doctrine of the mean: there is a vice 
of deficient concern, but no vice of excessive concern associated with the virtue 
of hope. 17 C. S. Lewis calls the despair which is a vice of deficient concern for 
heaven "disillusioned sensibleness." The "sensible man" gives up the longing 
for this special joy because he sees this world as never meant to satisfy it. 
LHe] soon decides that the whole thing was moonshine .... And so 
he settles down and learns not to expect too much and represses the 
part of himself which used, as he would say, 'to cry for the moon.' 
This is, of course, a much better way than [the way of the fool], and 
makes a man much happier, and less of a nuisance to society. It tends 
to make him a prig . . . . 18 
But why are there no vices of excessive concern associated with hope? Appa-
rently Christians in the Augustinian tradition believe the concern hope involves, 
the concern for heaven, the deep longing for something more than what this 
world offers, cannot be too important in one's web of concerns. Stated another 
way, this deep longing should be the central passion of one's life. 
To cast some light on this last claim, consider how a Christian might respond 
to the objection that one can be too concerned about heaven. The objection might 
be pressed as follows: both "other-worldly" Christians and fanatical members of 
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Christian "cults" are too concerned about heaven. The other-worldly brother 
thinks so much about the next world that he is 'no good for this world.' Thinking 
about heaven seems to be a full time project; no time is left for compassion, 
justice, and responsibilities in this world. The cult fanatic withdraws from normal 
affairs and attempts to create a separate 'heaven on earth.' Preocuppied with 
heaven, she thinks she can find it, or make it in this world. Though they differ 
in construing the world properly (the other-worldly Christian) or not (the cult 
fanatic), do not both display an excessive concern for heaven? 
Of course "other-worldliness" and "cult-fanaticism" as I have described them 
are not ideal forms of Christian spirituality and indicate some vice or vices, but 
one need not explain these as "excessive concern for heaven. " Other explanations 
are close at hand: either other-worldly Christians and cult fanatics lack other 
concerns or, misunderstanding "heaven," they lack a true concern for heaven. 
The first sort of explanation goes like this: the other-worldly Christian is properly 
concerned for heaven but is not concerned, for example for his own suffering, 
and thus is not compassionate. He may believe that a concern for heaven limits 
or rules out altogether a concern for his own suffering, but this is a mistake. 
Longing for heaven does help one take a certain perspective on suffering-it is 
not the final physical and moral tragedy it might otherwise seem to be-but this 
is a far cry from making one less concerned about suffering. Here the primary 
problem is that the concern for heaven has not yet properly ordered other concerns, 
but some confusion about the nature of heaven is also involved. The latter 
confusion is prominent in the second sort of explanation, which goes like this: 
the other-worldly Christian misunderstands the nature of heaven. He mistakenly 
thinks that heaven is an eternal, blissful life, the living of which is not internally 
related to compassion, justice, mercy, and the other Christian virtues; that it is 
a reward for those who have joined the right church, given to the appropriate 
charities, or lived according to the correct moral rules in this life; that enjoying 
heaven does not require that one be developing the Christian virtues and the 
concerns they presuppose. 19 The desire for heaven, properly understood, however, 
is a desire for fellowship with a holy God. The desire for heaven, then, should 
order and encourage those concerns central to the Christian substantive virtues. 
Thus, what the other-worldly Christian is too concerned about is not heaven, 
but a false substitute. Similar explanations could be made of cult fanaticism. 
I promised that consideration of the Christian interpretation of these deviant 
forms of spirituality would illumine the concern for heaven as a central passion 
in a Christian virtue ethic. The longing for heaven, properly understood, is a 
central passion in the sense that it is a longing for a community which encourages 
all of the Christian concerns which will have a role in heaven, and gives a 
purpose to those Christian concerns which will not be necessary for heaven, but 
have a role to play in the Christian life in this world. The concern for heaven, 
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then, is a concern for a community essential to developing and exercising the 
Christian web of concern. 
But this is not enough. Adequate financial resources may be essential for 
developing and exercising most of one's concerns, yet because it is merely part 
of what one requires one may be too concerned about finances. So more must 
be said: the concern for heaven is a concern for a community both necessary 
and sufficient for developing and exercising the Christian web of concerns. 
IV. 
The point of the doctrine of the mean is this: no single concern is absolute; 
other concerns sometimes are more important. This is primafacie correct. I have 
argued that the doctrine of the mean does apply to some Christian virtues, like 
compassion, but does not apply to hope, because hope is conceptually linked to 
an inclusive concern. The concern for heaven is inclusive of all other Christian 
concerns because heaven, properly understood, is a community which is the 
necessary and sufficient rationale for or, when realized, support of the develop-
ment and exercise of all one's other proper concerns. The concern for heaven 
is unique: no other concern could be both necessary and sufficient for developing 
the Christian character, for two different things cannot both be necessary and 
sufficient for the same result. 
Hope is conceptually linked to a unique, inclusive concern. Does this mean 
that, as a violation of the doctrine of the mean, hope is unique among the 
Christian substantive virtues? Not necessarily, since other virtues might be linked 
to the concern for heaven. 
Christian love is the most likely candidate. There are three ways of interpreting 
the virtue of Christian love. First, I interpreted Christian love as a package of 
related virtues, like compassion, which involve concern for other people. How-
ever, to each of these virtues the doctrine of the mean does apply. Second, 
Christian love might be seen as a single virtue inclusive of all such ways of 
being properly concerned for other people. Viewed in this way Christian love 
would be absolute over substantive virtues relating the individual to other people, 
but it still might be in conflict with a proper love for self or God. The doctrine 
of the mean would apply here: one could be too much or too little concerned 
for other people because in some circumstances this concern can interfere with 
proper concern for oneself or God. Third, Christian love might be construed as 
the Christian's concern for God, which, properly understood, is inclusive of all 
the ways of being appropriately concerned for oneself and other people. With 
this virtue one would be concerned for everyone's full development into children 
of God, capable of enjoying His presence forever; that is, one would be properly 
concerned for heaven. 
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Perhaps Christian love for God is a second Christian virtue to which the 
doctrine of the mean does not apply. Or is Christian love for God, so described, 
just the virtue of hope by a different name? 
Georgetown College 
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